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Unfolded History: Vico’s Method of “Explication” 
as an Alternative to Enlightenment Rationalism
SABRINA FERRI
Vico’s theory of knowledge opposes mainstream Enlightenment ideas that emphasize the centrality of reason as a means to acquire 
knowledge. For Vico, the radical rationalism of the modern age preludes 
a new age of infernal barbarity, dominated by the “barbarism of refl ec-
tion.” The seeds of the “barbarism of refl ection” are already contained 
in the analytical approach epitomized in the method of Descartes, which 
assumes that knowledge emerges from separating, distinguishing, and 
classifying. Such a method involves a form of thinking that inhibits the 
imagination and the creative power of thought and forces the human mind 
to dry and purely derivative processes. Vico’s answer to the constraints 
of extreme rationalism lies in the epistemological method of “explica-
tion,”1 or spiegazione, as he calls it in the New Science.
This paper will address the following points: 1. What spiegazione 
is, understood as both the method at the basis of the “new science” and 
the activity of thinking that is required for understanding history and 
the course of nations; 2. in what ways the method of explication differs 
from the analytical method of criticism; and 3. how spiegazione brings 
the imagination into play.
In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant introduces a distinction between 
two different modes of producing knowledge: defi nition—Erklärung 
or clarifi cation—and explication—explicatio.2 Kant maintains the rela-
tive superiority of clarifi cation over explication, as the former allows 
one to determine a concept exactly and to defi ne it within its limits, 
whereas the latter, which is limited to an empirical fi eld of application, 
can never be exhaustive.
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Kant gives the example of gold.3 This concept cannot be defi ned, 
he says, because whereas one person might think that one of the defi n-
ing properties of gold is that it does not rust, another person might not 
include this among its characteristics. Such a concept, Kant argues, can 
only be “explicated.” Explication, thus, derives from the impossibility 
of setting clear and suffi cient marks to defi ne an object and is set against 
the notion of Erklärung, intended as a defi nition that expounds “a thing’s 
comprehensive concept originally within its bounds.”4
But if we consider the notion of “explication” from a different point 
of view, we can see how the absence of “secure boundaries” can turn 
out to be not only productive, but also decisive. Explicatio is creative 
and mimics the pattern of human thinking that is never confi ned within 
“secure boundaries” but is an ever-progressing activity. As a matter of fact, 
explicatio literally means “unfolding” and implies a constant movement 
forward, beyond the limits imposed by clarifi cation/defi nition. Moreover 
explication involves the “making” of something new, since ex-plicare also 
means “to de-velop,” to create something new out of the embracing and 
interweaving of different things, out of a pleated tangle. If “defi nition” 
shows the truth in its nudity, Vico’s strategy is based on explication.
Spiegazione and spiegare are recurring terms in the New Science. 
The introduction, in which Vico presents the “idea of the work” through 
a detailed description of the Dipintura, is defi ned as a “spiegazione.” 
The adjectival past participle “spiegata” is referred to the “rational 
humanity” of the third age, when “human reason [is] fully developed,”5 
where “spiegata” indicates the fi nal stage in which a thing’s nature is 
revealed. Thus “spiegare” also indicates the movement of the human 
mind that opens up to comprehend—literally, to receive and to under-
stand—things: “for when man understands [con l’intendere] he extends 
his mind [spiega la sua mente] and takes in [comprende] the things” 
(par. 405). Finally, the “metaphysical art of criticism” on which Vico 
founds his new science is in itself a process of explication: “the same 
metaphysical criticism of the history of the obscurest antiquity, that is, 
the explanation [spiegazione] of the ideas the earliest nations naturally 
formed” (par. 905). Indeed, for Vico the truth about the past is something 
that needs to be “explicated,” unfolded, like the etymological derivations 
he develops or the emblems that he unwraps into a narration.
As its etymology reveals, explication presupposes a fold, plica. The 
conceptual fi eld delimited by the notion of the fold opens up the possibil-
ity of conceiving of realities that are shaped by a dynamic cumulative 
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process of transformation in which there is no dissipation but a constant 
re-gathering, or folding.6 This picture corresponds to Vico’s vision of 
history as something that is gathered together with multiple pleats.7 In 
a way, for Vico, time does not fl ow; rather it saturates objects and cir-
cumstances. The fold and the notion of “spiegazione” apply to the idea 
of a pleated world, where continuity prevails over fracture and truth is 
layered and stratifi ed.
Indeed, for Vico the sources of history—the “great fragments of 
antiquity,” to use his own expression—are like clusters of temporal, 
spatial, and psychological condensation. A single fragment—a word, a 
myth, a fable—contains the traces of past times within manifold pleats. 
Embedded in a single fragment are the modifi cations of social practices 
and institutions as well as the ontogenetic changes of the forma mentis of 
human beings. In order to recover its meaning it is necessary to unravel 
the tangle into an explication.
An example of such an explication is found in the etymological 
development8 of the Latin word lex, “law,” which contains within itself 
the different stages in the establishment of human institutions. “First [lex] 
must have meant a collection of acorns. Thence we believe is derived 
ilex, as it were illex, the oak (as certainly aquilex means collector of 
waters); for the oak produces the acorns by which the swine are drawn 
together. Lex was next a collection of vegetables, from which the latter 
were called legumina. Later on, at a time when vulgar letters had not 
yet been invented for writing down the laws lex by a necessity of civil 
nature must have meant a collection of citizens, or the public parliament; 
so that the presence of people was the lex, or “law,” that solemnized the 
wills that were made calatis comitiis, in the presence of the assembled 
comitia. Finally, collecting letters, and making, as it were, a sheaf of 
them for each word, was called legere, reading” (NS par. 240). The 
etymology of lex shows the successive displacements of sense that, in 
the process of explication, lead to the unfolding of human history. In the 
beginnings of humanity, when human beings still inhabited the forests 
and later on when they developed agriculture and animal husbandry, 
lex indicated the gathering of food, i.e., physical subsistence; when 
collectivities formed, lex became the expression of a social and civil 
intention; fi nally, in the refi ned age of the academies, lex came to mean 
“lectura,” or reading, that is to say a practice of abstract thought.
Here a single word is “explicated” into a chain of interconnected 
meanings. As this example shows, Vico’s main concern is not to restore 
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the proper derivation and root of the word; his etymological explication 
creates historical meaning by developing a temporal unfolding of social 
mutations. The kinetic movement of explication opens up what was con-
tained in multiple pleats and organizes it into a narration whose progression 
replicates the temporal structure of what Vico calls “the order of civil 
institutions.” Explication does not simply make explicit what was implicit 
in the fold, but it generates new meaning by establishing relationships 
and connections between the different planes of the fold.
In this respect, the method of explication is diametrically opposed 
to what Vico calls the “studies of methods and criticism” to which most 
of his scholarly colleagues are dedicated.9 These scholars are trapped 
in a refl exive loop. Their critical method does not allow them to create 
meaning by “developing” it, because the rationalistic process is based on 
a strategy of analysis, separation, and distinction. In his Second Response 
to the critics of his metaphysics, Vico explains that criticism divides, 
selects, and isolates what has been collected, “dall’ammassato divide e 
rimuove”—it extracts from, divides and analyzes the tangle.10 Criticism 
corresponds to the arid mechanism of reason by which reality is dissected 
and atomized at the expense of the interrelatedness of things. Above all, 
clarity and distinctness for Vico do not produce new knowledge; they 
make manifest what is already in the “tangle” (“l’ammassato”), but they 
do not establish new, unexpected connections. These methods waste the 
intendimento whose offi ce is “to see the wholeness of each thing and to 
see it all together. . . . In order to see a thing in its wholeness, the intellect 
must consider each thing under all the relationships that it may have 
with all the rest of the universe and fi nd instantly some commonness 
based on reason between the thing to be perfectly understood and all 
the other things totally dissimilar or most remote.”11
In the New Science of 1730, in his address to the young reader, Vico 
implicitly argues for this kind of synthetic approach when he recommends 
that the former should have “una mente comprensiva,”12 an associative 
mind that is able to unite and make sense of the most disparate things: 
“e perciò ti bisogna meditare più addentro le cose; e col combinarle 
vieppiù vederle in più ampia distesa”—you must meditate upon things 
in depth and by combining them you’ll be able to see them in a broader 
expanse, “distesa.”13 This passage defi nes Vico’s strategy of explica-
tion: to descend into the fold, to fi nd and combine what is gathered 
there and bring it into view in what is fi nally a “distesa,” an “expanse” 
and no longer a “pleated tangle.” This suggests a disclosure, or better a 
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construction of meaning that takes place by connecting things and ideas 
into an extended narrative form.
As Donald Phillip Verene has highlighted, the narration is the philo-
sophical method that enables Vico himself, and the reader of the New 
Science with him, to express the course of history into an intelligible and 
complete speech, or fabula.14 “Spiegare” is an unfolding of meaning into 
a narration. But the notion of explication also suggests the possibility of 
a fi nal moment of “illumination.” As Vico himself suggests, by following 
the explication of the new science “si avrà tutta spiegata la storia” (NS 
par. 1096). The 1744 New Science culminates into a literal “unfolding” 
of human history, which leaves the reader to contemplate “this world 
of nations in all the expanse [distesa] of its places, times, and varieties” 
(par. 345). This “distesa,” a temporal and spatial unfolding, is the fi nal 
outcome of the “spiegazione”; it is the moment of the explicatio of sense 
that lends itself to contemplation. “Spiegare” also means to “lay open 
to the view, to display.” As suggested by the two visual verbs—see and 
contemplate—that Vico uses in reference to the “distesa,” the explanation 
produces an image, almost a visual tale “of the course [that] the nations 
run” whose ultimate purpose is to engage the imagination.
The place of images in Vico’s work has been widely discussed by 
critics, especially in relation to the emblematic character of the New 
Science.15 In this context, I want to call attention to the iconographic 
quality that Vico attributes to explication. The chapter on the “Epitomes 
of Poetic Wisdom” in the New Science contains a signifi cant instance 
of the visual layering of time and meaning: the shield of Achilles, in 
which “more full [piena] and detailed [spiegata] . . . is the history of the 
world” (par. 681). Vico explains that the images chiseled onto the shield 
offer a graphic condensation of the “history of the [heroic] world” in all 
its “fullness.” In four numbered paragraphs, he illustrates the different 
scenes through a detailed narration that extends from the creation of 
the world through the formation of families to the emergence of the 
arts. The narrative describing the engraved scenes follows their circular 
disposition around the shield. Thus, the movement of explication goes 
from the image to the narrative and back to the image. At the end of the 
explication, the reader is confronted once again with the image of the 
chiseled shield, whose narrative implications are now fully exposed.16
Vico’s historical ekphrasis of the shield recalls the interpretive move-
ment that the reader of the New Science is called to perform at the end of 
the book. In the “Practic of the New Science,” an appendix that Vico had 
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planned to add to his work to illustrate the practical aspects of his theory, 
he urges the readers who want to comprehend the full import of his new 
science, to contemplate “the course the nations run,” the course of history.17 
This practice, he explains, “requires of us that, from these human times of 
acute and intelligent minds in which we are born, we should here at the 
end look back [guardare a rovescio] to the picture that was placed at the 
beginning.”18 The dipintura is expressly designed to be impressed upon 
the mind of the reader. It is a mnemonic device that the reader can use 
both at the beginning of the book to gather the general sense of Vico’s 
work and at the end as a memory aid for recalling what he has read. But 
it is also a visual synopsis of the New Science itself. It contains—so to 
speak—the entire story of the social world as reconstructed by Vico. Like 
Achilles’ shield, however, it is opaque to direct interpretation and needs 
to be explained. For the image to become meaningful, it is necessary to 
turn it into a story—a fabula—that illustrates and establishes connec-
tions between the elements contained in the space of the picture, i.e., the 
hieroglyphs and the other fi gurative features of the dipintura. The result-
ing narrative articulates the relationships between the different stages of 
social development and makes the picture historically intelligible. Thus, 
the explication of the dipintura—which is, in fact, the entire narrative 
of the New Science, and not just the initial “spiegazione”—gives the 
dipintura historical depth—or rather, length, since it articulates in time 
the simultaneities of the picture.
In order to refer back to the initial etching, the reader needs to go 
through the book backwards, to follow once again the explicated text 
and refl ect on its development, which mimics the movement of history 
itself. The fi nal act of comprehension takes place by contemplating 
“tutta spiegata la storia.” The New Science has given the reader a full 
view of history, that is to say, a “distesa” in which time is unfolded and 
arrested, exactly as in a picture. In this standstill it is possible to grasp 
the fundamental interconnections between the present and the past and 
to “imagine” the future, i.e., to recognize a pattern of development that 
can be extended indefi nitely. Such is the result of explication, since, as an 
ever–progressing activity of comprehension, it can never be exhausted 
as in a mere defi nition. The end of the book gives the reader a vantage 
point from which he can see, clearly explicated, the succession of corsi 
and ricorsi—it is almost a super-historical perspective from which the 
actual facts of the civil world come to be seen as parts of an eternal 
providential design.
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The Dipintura, which comes to coincide with the beginning and the 
end of the narrative of the New Science, represents both the idea—the 
point of origin from which the process of explication departs—and the 
outcome—the moment in which the truth that has been “developed” is 
fi nally shown to the reader, “laid open to his view.” The explication lends 
the initial image a meaning, transforming the metaphor into articulated 
language. But it also leads the reader to conjure up a “mental image” of 
the New Science, which, by the end, he is openly invited to contemplate. 
In other words, by refl ecting on the “spiegazione,” the reader is urged 
to apprehend the theory—theorein, to see—of the new science, which 
he will be then called on to put into practice.
In conclusion, explication is never divorced from language. It is 
rooted in the narrative process, in that it fi nds the truth by composition, 
by constructing a narrative that actively attempts to bind things together. 
As a “synthetic” method, it appears to be an implicit critique of Cartesian 
criticism and the analytical method. Vico’s “nova Critica” is based on the 
belief that knowledge does not emerge from splitting, but from creatively 
uniting and combining scattered elements. The “new art of criticism,” as 
Vico explains in the First New Science, is also a method whose function 
is to clarify things, as much as the Kantian Erklärung: it “serves as a 
torch by which to discern what is true in obscure and fabulous history.”19 
To “explicate” means to attempt to create a fabula out of the “various 
species of men, deeds, or things” (NS par. 210) that have been concealed 
in the folds of history. The “spiegazione” brings to light the things of the 
past and, by comparing and connecting them into a continuous narration, 
it rediscovers them and fi nds new revelatory relations. In this respect, 
it is also fundamentally a topical art, in the sense in which, for Vico, 
topics departs from perception and the visual image and “ritruova ed 
ammassa”—discovers things and collects them. It is a fertile method, 
based on the inventive, imaginative power of human thought.20
Explication connects “inventively” the different logoi of human eras 
enabling us to understand the past with “una mente comprensiva,” but 
it also extends a bridge between theory and praxis, idea and language, 
and human time and ideal eternal history. Ultimately, it shows history 
as a whole, completely unfolded and bound together by a unifying 
logos—“the language spoken by the ideal eternal history”—that har-
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